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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/k/a KRYSTAL M. BARRETT
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual,
Defendant-Cross-defendant-Appellant,
and
BRP INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Crossclaimant-Respondent,
and
BANK OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.
Supreme Court Docket No. 38109-2010

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Fremont County.
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding.

Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant,
Kelly N. Clay
Bradley J. Dixon, Esq., residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent,
BRP Incorporated
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ARGUMENT
I.
CLAY CLARIFIES RELEVANT FACTS.
Kinghorn and Clay understood that Clay had a valid claim for breach of the loan agreement
against Kinghorn who did not pay in full the amount Clay cosigned at the bank.

1

Kinghorn and

Clay agreed pursuant to stipulation to account for damages arising from their competing claims.

2

Clay and Kinghorn asked the district court to rule on an accounting after entering the stipulation.

3

When the court entered its order based on Kinghorn and Clay's stipulation, it awarded Clay his
damages for Kinghorn's breach of the loan agreement 'in the stipulated amount of $22,235.33.

4

Thus, the issue of Clay's claim against Kinghorn for breach of contract was dealt with in the
stipulation, which the court accepted and ruled on in Clay's favor.

s

The efforts of Attorney Smith

6

led to Clay recovering this $22,235.33 amount. Before Attorney Smith entered the case, Clay was
looking at paying Kinghorn damages without even any offset for the amount Kinghorn owed Clay.7

1 R Vol. I, p. 199.
2 R Vol. I, p. 174.
3 R Vol. I, p. 174.
4 R Vol. ", p. 210.
S R Vol. I, p. 174.
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II.
ATTORNEY SMITH HAS A LIEN UNDER IDAHO CODE § 3-205 IN LIGHT OF I.R.C.P 15(bl, PUBLIC
POLICY, EQUITY, THE INTENT OF THE CHARGING LIEN STATUTE, AND THE CHARGING LIEN STATUTE
ITSELF.
A.

Clay Recovered $22,235.33 On His Claim For Breach Of The Loan Agreement That The
Parties Tried To The Court On Clay's Counterclaim Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 15(b).
Relying on the language of Idaho Code § 3-205, BRP claims that Attorney Smith cannot

have a lien under § 3-205 because Clay did not recover on a counter claim in which Clay sought
affirmative relief. Idaho Code § 3-205 reads as folfows:
From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of
action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his
client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come.
Specificafly, BRP latches onto the counterclaim requirement in Idaho Code § 3-205 to support its
argument that Attorney Smith cannot have a lien because Clay never filed a counterclaim.
However, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) states:

When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of

these issues.
I.R.C.P.15(b) (emphasis added). "lfthe trial court grants relief not specificafly pled by the parties,
then the issue must be tried by express or implied consent of the parties." O'Connor v. Harger

6 R Vol. II, p. 210.
7 R Vol. I, pp. 141-47.
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Canst., Inc. 145 Idaho 904, 911 (2008). The language "shall" and "all" of Rule 15(b) is mandatory

and comprehensive leaving no wiggle room for its applicability. Rule 15(b) treats issues the
parties consensually try to the court in all respects as if the parties had raised the issues in a
pleading. This rule applies "even if the issue is one which should have been raised in a
compulsory counterclaim." Aha v. Maragas, 605 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 2000).
Kinghorn and Clay expressly consented to trial of the issue of Kinghorn's breach of the loan
agreement through their stipulation and summary judgment. Having neither filed nor raised at
any time an objection to the stipulation or resolving this issue on summary judgment, BRP
impliedly consented to trying Clay's claim for Kinghorn's breach of the loan agreement on
summary judgment. Thus, under Rule 15(b), Kinghorn, Clay, and BRP tried Clay's counterclaim for
breach of the loan agreement to the court. Moreover, under Rule 15(b), Clay's counterclaim

"shall be treated in all respects" as if Clay had raised it in the pleadings. Clay submits that this
mandatory and comprehensive language applies to satisfy the counterclaim requirement
contained in Idaho Code § 3-205.
B.

Not Applying Rule 15(b) In This Context Promotes Judicial Waste.
If this Court does not apply Rule 15(b) broadly and treat Clay's counterclaim as if raised in

the pleadings "in all respects" as the Rule requires, the result will be superfluous filings from
lawyers who will file needless pleadings in an abundance of caution for fear they will be the next
exception to Rule 1S(b).
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C.

Equity And The Intent Of Idaho Code § 3-205 Favor Attorney Smith's Charging Lien.
"Variously phrased, the intent of the law [Idaho Code § 3-205] ... is to allow the attorney

an interest in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures his right to compensation for
obtaining the recovery or fund for his client." Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 75 (1981)
(citations omitted). Moreover, "where he [the attorney] has produced a fund, he has an equitable
interest therein recognized by the lien statute and relevant case law." !d.
Here, Attorney Smith's skill and labor resulted in a fund payable to Clay in the amount of
$22,235.33. Attorney Smith created the fund when the district court issued a favorable decision
requiring that Kinghorn pay Clay the $22,235.33. Thus, Attorney Smith has satisfied the intent of
Idaho Code § 3-205. Moreover, under Skelton, Attorney Smith has an equitable interest in the
fund that he created.
BRP wrongly asserts that Attorney Smith's efforts on Clay's behalf were sterile. BRP
misreads this language in Skelton. The "sterile efforts" language in Skelton is merely flowery
language to describe the existence of a fund. In other words, if the attorney's efforts are fruitful,
he has created a fund to which his lien can attach. If the attorney's efforts are "sterile," then he
has created no fund to which his lien can attach.
BRP cites Skelton to say Attorney Smith's efforts were "sterile"; therefore, Attorney Smith
produced no fund to which a lien could attach. BRP claims Attorney Smith's efforts were sterile
explaining, "Attorney Smith did not recover a fund on behalf of Clay because he merely defended

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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and protected Clay's interest in the property."s However, Attorney Smith obtained a court order
requiring Kinghorn to pay Clay $22,235.33. Obviously, this is a "fund." The reason BRP ignores
this reality and claims Clay "merely defended and protected Clay's interest in the property" is that
BRP ignores application of Rule 15(b) where Clay prevailed on his counterclaim that all parties
consensually tried on summary judgment.
BRP further claims that Attorney Smith's efforts were sterile creating no "fund in favor of
Clay because BRP is entitled to a setoff of the damages it was awarded on its cross-claim against
Clay.,,9 Clay addresses in detail BRP's faulty setoff argument later in this brief. However, BRP's
argument is flawed because BRP has no right of setoff on Clay's successful counterclaim against
Kinghorn. Specifically, BRP has no competing claim against Clay for his successful recovery against
Kinghorn. In other words, only Kinghorn could possibly have a claim for setoff against Clay's
recovery against Kinghorn, not BRP.
In short, equity and the intent of Idaho Code § 3-205 favor Attorney Smith's charging lien
where Attorney Smith created a fund to which a lien could attach. And BRP's argument that
Attorney Smith's efforts were "sterile" is without merit.
D.

The Express Language Of The Charging Lien Statute Creates A Lien In Favor Of Attorney
Smith.
The plain language of the attorney's lien statute comports with Attorney Smith's assertion

that Attorney Smith has satisfied the requirements for an attorney's charging lien. The statute

8 Brief Of Respondent BRP Incorporated, p. 16.
9 Brief Of Respondent BRP Incorporated, p. 17.
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states, in relevant part:
From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of
action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his
client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come;
Idaho Code § 3-205.
Here, an action was commenced in which Attorney Smith appeared in behalf of Clay, a
party to the action. Accordingly, Attorney Smith has a lien upon Clay's cause of action for breach
of the loan agreement, which lien attached to the favorable decision requiring Kinghorn to pay
$22,235.33 to Clay. The proceeds are currently in the hands of BRP, and Attorney Smith has a lien
on those funds. Thus, applying the statute itself gives Attorney Smith a lien.
BRP wrongly relies on Kenneth F. White, Chtd. v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
136 Idaho 238 (Ct. App. 2001) for the proposition that Attorney Smith cannot have a lien where
Clay filed no counterclaim.

White is easily distinguished because in White there was no action

commenced whereas here Kinghorn filed an action, and Clay recovered the funds in that action
pursuant to a favorable court decision. Accordingly, this Court should distinguish the Court of
Appeals authority BRP relies on.
III.

BRP HAS NO CLAIM TO CLAY'S FUNDS BECAUSE BRP RELIES ON A PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT PROCEDURE AFTER BRP OBTAINED A JUDGMENT.
A prejudgment writ of attachment procedure applies only before a party obtains a
judgment. Idaho Code Section 8-501 states, in relevant part:

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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The plaintiff at the time of the issuing of summons, or at any time afterwards may
make application to have the property of the defendant attached in accordance with the
procedures provided for in this chapter, as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered, unless the defendant gives security to pay such judgment as in this
chapter provided in the following cases.
Idaho Code § 8-501 (emphasis added). Moreover, Idaho Code Section 8-502(e) provides "[u]pon
the hearing on the order to show cause, the court shall consider the showing made by the parties
appearing, and shall make a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable
probability that the plaintiff will prevail in its claim . ... The court may direct the order in which
the writ shall be levied upon different assets of the defendant, if, in the aggregate, they exceed in
value an amount clearly adequate to secure any judgment which may be recovered by the

plaintiff." (Emphasis added).
Taken together, the quoted portions of Sections 8-501 and 8-502(e) envision a writ of
attachment procedure that applies prejudgment to secure satisfaction of a future judgment that a
plaintiff may obtain, not to a judgment the plaintiff has already obtained. Accordingly, the writ of
attachment procedure under Section 8-501, et. seq. does not apply where the plaintiff already has
a judgment that he simply seeks to enforce.
Here, BRP obtained a judgment against Clay on January 26, 2010.

10

Afterwards, BRP

sought to implement the prejudgment writ of attachment procedure under Section 8-501 to
attach Clay's proceeds.

ll

However, this procedure applies only prejudgment, not post judgment,

because its purpose is to secure any judgment that the plaintiff may recover. BRP relied on the

10 R Vol. II, p. 215.
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wrong procedure to attach Clay's proceeds. Having already obtained a judgment, BRP should
have executed on the proceeds under Idaho Code Section 11-102. Accordingly, BRP did not attach
Clay's proceeds.
IV.

BRP HAS NOT SUED ON A CLAIM FOR WHICH BRP COULD OBTAIN A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT.
Idaho Code § 8-501 states that a plaintiff may obtain a writ of attachment "In an action

upon a judgment, or upon contract, express or implied, for the direct payment of money." Th us,
under Section 8-501, a plaintiff may obtain a pre-judgment writ for one of two purposes: A
plaintiff can obtain a pre-judgment writ when suing upon a judgment obtained in a prior
proceeding; or a plaintiff can obtain a pre-judgment writ when suing on a contract for the direct
payment of money. This situation fits neither of those requirements. BRP did not sue Clay on any
judgment. Nor did BRP sue Clay on any contract for the direct payment of money. BRP sued Clay
on a warranty deed. Even assuming a warranty deed is a "contract," the warranty deed was not a
contract for the direct payment of money. Thus, this case is not even a proper case for a writ of
attachment under Section 8-501.

V.
BRP'S SETOFF ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT.
BRP claims that it has a setoff against any funds Kinghorn owed to Clay. BRP cites Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure (54)(b),which states:

11 R Vol. II, p. 234.
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If any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such as on a
claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall be offset against each
other and a single judgment for the difference between the entitlements shall be
entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment.
I.R.C.P.54(b). BRP and Clay are neither cross-claimants, nor do they have a claim and
counterclaim or offsetting judgments against each other. Setoff is allowed if judgments are
awarded "where competing claims arise out of the same transaction or instrument." Banque
Indosuez v. Sopwith Holdings Corp., 772 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (N.Y. 2002).

Here, BRP's claims do not arise out of the same transaction or instrument as Clay's breach
of contract claim against Kinghorn that lead to Attorney Smith's recovery of the fund. Clay's
counterclaim arises under the breach of loan agreement between Clay and Kinghorn, while BRP's
claim arises under a breach of warranty deed between Clay and BRP. The setoff rule requires
"judgments against each other" which does not exist here and which BRP has not claimed. If the
$22,235.33 paid to Clay were in satisfaction of a judgment against BRP a setoff would be
appropriate, but such is not the case.12
BRP curiously cites Brown v. Porter, 42 Idaho 295, 245 P. 398 (1926) for the proposition
that except where denied or limited, the right of setoff exists in Idaho. Brown is inapposite as it
deals only with whether a bank can setoff debts a depositor owes with money deposited for other
purposes. There was no issue involving a cross-claim or claim and counterclaim or competing
judgments in the facts of Brown whatsoever. Furthermore, in every case BRP cites in which a

12 Interestingly, BRP acknowledges that Clay recovered on his counterclaim against Kinghorn for purposes of BRP's
setoff argument but turns a blind eye to Clay's recovery on his counterclaim against Kinghorn for purposes of Attorney

APPElLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\7997\Pleadings\059.Reply Brief.Final Version.doc

Page 11 of 16

setoff was allowed, none involve setoff by party A of an amount owed between parties Band C, as
BRP desires in this case. In all cases BRP cites, the parties had competing judgments against each
other which were setoff.
BRP cites Dawson v. Eldredge, 89 Idaho 402 (1965), which is not about an attorney's lien
but a mechanic's lien involving only two litigants with competing claims and judgments. Id. at
409. BRP cites 8anque Indosuez, 772 N.E.2d 1112 (N.V. 2002) for the proposition that an
attorney's lien is only recoverable against a client's net recovery after setoff. That same case
states that "an attorney's charging lien maintains superiority over a right of setoff where the
setoff is unrelated to the judgment or settlement to which the attorney's lien attached." Id. at
1117. 8anque Indosuez involves one defendant and one class of plaintiffs. In this respect, the

facts differ greatly from the present case. Here, the judgment BRP seeks to offset is unrelated to
the judgment or settlement to which Attorney Smith's lien attached; therefore, Attorney Smith's
lien is superior to BRP's claim of setoff.
BRP cites Reed v. Reed, 10 S.W.3d 173 (Mo.Ct.App. 1999) for the same proposition as
8anque Indosuez. But that case sheds even more light on the requirement that the competing

claims arise under the same transaction. "If, however, the right to set off [is of] a demand wholly
unrelated to the matter out of which sprung [the attorney's lien] then the attorney's lien takes
priority. Thus, for instance, [this court] held that the attorney's lien took priority over the claim of
set-off where the second judgment was based on tort and the first on contract, as those are

Smith's lien under Idaho Code Section 3-205.
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unrelated causes of action." Id. at 179 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the Kinghorn dispute which led to Clay's recovery was a breach of the loan
agreement. BRP's claim, however, is for breach of a warranty deed. It does not arise under the
same facts, transaction or instrument. Thus, this case is like Reed where parties with competing
judgments could not claim a setoff because of the unrelated causes of action.
BRP cites Hobson Construction Co. v. Max Drill, Inc., 385 A.2d 1256 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) for the proposition that allowing Attorney Smith's lien violates principles of equity because
"the party holding the excess judgment should not be burdened by the fee of the attorney
representing the losing litigant." Id. at 1258. This case, like all others BRP relies on, deals only
with two parties holding competing judgments. This case is inapposite as Attorney Smith is
seeking lien priority for funds resulting from a claim against Kinghorn, not between BRP and Clay.
Finally, BRP cites Galbreath v. Armstrong, 193 P.2d 630 (Mont. 1948) which also involves
only two competing counterclaims and judgments. Id. at 390. To extend the reach of Galbreath
and other cases with competing and offsetting judgments to this case would require an
application not contemplated by any of the cited cases. In all those cases, a setoff involves
competing judgments where A owes B an amount and B owes A an amount and the party with the
greater judgment amount is paid the difference. Here, Kinghorn filed no claim against BRP, BRP
filed no claim against Kinghorn. The only connections between Kinghorn and BRP are the
property (not instruments) and Clay. Accordingly, Attorney Smith's lien is superior to BRP's
claimed attachment making Attorney Smith entitled to possession of the Clay funds.
APPElLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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VI.
IF ATTORNEY SMITH'S LIEN AND BRP'S WRIT ARE INVALID THE MONEY BELONGS TO CLAY.
If Attorney Smith's charging lien is valid and superior to any lien BRP may have by virtue of
its writ of attachment, then the $22,235.33 should be paid to Attorney Smith. If Attorney Smith's
charging lien is invalid but BRP's writ of attachment is meritorious, then BRP should keep the
money. But if Attorney Smith's charging lien and BRP's writ of attachment are both invalid, then
Clay should get the money. This is important because the district court concluded that Attorney
Smith's charging lien was invalid and ordered the money turned over to BRP without considering
the validity of BRP's petition for writ of attachment. The district court failed to consider that if
BRP's petition were invalid, Clay should get the money.
VII.

CONCLUSION.
For all the reasons set forth in this brief, Attorney Smith respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the order of the district court, recognize Attorney Smith's charging lien, award costs
on appeal to Attorney Smith, order BRP to return the $22,235.33 to the district court, and remand
this case to the district court to determine the proper amount of attorney's fees to be awarded
Attorney Smith to be paid from the $22,235.33.
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Alternatively, if this Court does not recognize Attorney Smith's charging lien, then this
Court should find that BRP has no right to a writ of attachment, order BRP to return the
$22,235.33 to the district court, where the district court can order the money returned to Clay.

-J-~

DATED this _'7_ day of October, 2011.

Bryan D
Attorneys for Defendant
Kelly N. Clay
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